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A prolonged period of persistent pressure on farmll incomes and net 
worth continues to cause severe problems for many farmers. The degree of 
difficulty being encountered on an individual basis varies, however, by 
debt level, size of operation, commodities produced, and locatio~! 
Educational efforts which focus on individual needs are ongoing.-
The purpose of this publication is to provide a broader perspective to 
financial conditions in agriculture. An overview of the current situation 
will be presented and key concerns for the year ahead identified. 
Differences between U.S. conditions and those in Nebraska will be noted 
wherever possible. Income concerns will be distinguished from balance 
sheet concerns. The impact of farm financial conditions on lenders, 
agribusinesses and rural communities will be briefly addressed. Finally, 
some policy alternatives for dealing with current concerns will be 
outlined. 
A major limiting factor in analyzing current financial conditions in 
agriculture is the lack of comprehensive and up-to-the-minute data. With 
conditions apparently changing rapidly, analysts are frequently forced to 
use data that are several months old when making judgments about current 
conditions. In this publication, available information from the 
Agricultural Finance Outlook and Situation (ERS, USDA, January, 1985), the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Seminar by Emanuel 
Melichar for the Congressional Budget Office, November 13, 1984), and a 
survey by the American Bankers Association (June, 1984) account for much of 
the data used. 
* Frederick is Professor and Extension Economist and Johnson is Associate 
Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, UN-L. 
11 Also includes ranches. 
Z/ In particular, the "Managing for Tomorrow" program, sponsored by the 
Nebraska Cooperative Extension Service is worthy of mention. 
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Farm Income 
· Any analysis of financial prospects for farmers and ranchers sooner or 
later must come to the heart of the matter: What is the outlook for farm 
income? In 1985, this is particularly important because of a succession of 
years with below average returns. The decline in farm incomes in the 1980s 
is largely attributable to a reversal in favorable conditions that 
prevailed during the 1970s. 
Exports of agricultural products, which contributed significantly to 
the best period of the 1970s, have generally fallen since 1980. In part, 
the turnaround is a reflection of poor economic conditions elsewhere in the 
world. In addition, the United States, for a variety of reasons, appears 
to have lost some of its competitive advantage to other exporting nations. 
Second, rising production costs, particularly the cost of servicing 
debt, have been a drain on agricultural sector income generally and highly 
leveraged farmers in particular. For example, in 1982 and again in 1983, 
Nebraska's farm operators incurred interest charges of over one billion 
dollars, an amount equal to about one-sixth of all production expenses. In 
contrast to the high inflation of the 1970s, high interest rates not only 
increase costs (and reduce income) but also cause financial deterioration 
of farm assets (especially real estate). 
Both net cash income and net farm income have generally declined 
through the-T980s (Lines 11 and 13, Table 1). 
Net cash income, which measures the difference between gross cash 
income and cash expenses, represents the amount of income available to 
purchase assets, retire loans and cover household expenses. On a real 
(inflation adjusted) basis, net cash income has been trending lower since 
1978. The only exception to this trend was in 1983 when government 
payments, including PIK commodities, combined with lower production 
expenses to produce a 4.5 percent year-to-year gain in real net cash 
income. However, current indications are that the downtrend in real net 
cash income resumed in 1984 and will continue in 1985 as well. So far in 
the 1980s, real net cash income has averaged more than 20 percent below the 
1970s and slightly below the 1960s. 
Net farm income has been more erratic than net cash income for at 
least the last dozen years. In large part, the greater year-to-year 
variation in net farm income is accounted for by shifts in inventory 
values. When stocks are reduced, the inventory adjustment has a negative 
impact on gross and net farm income. However when stocks increase - as 
occurred in 1984 - the positive inventory adjustment pushes gross and net 
farm incomes higher. 
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TABLE 1. u.s. Farm Income and Cash Flow Statement 
Item 1981 1982 1983 1984F 1985F 
Billion Dollars 
Farm Income Sources: 
--1. Cash rec7ipts 142.6 144.8 138.7 139-143 142-147 
Crop~ 73.3 74.6 69.5 68-72 70-74 
Livestock 69.2 70.1 69.2 70-74 71-75 
2. Direct government payments 1.9 3.5 9.3 7-10 4-7 
Cash government payments 1.9 3.5 4.1 3-5 4-7 
Value of PIK co~~odities 0.0 0.0 5.2 4-6 0 
3. Other cash income- 1.9 2.0 1.5 1-3 1-3 
4. Gross cash incom7 (1+2+3)~/ 146.4 150.2 149.6 150-154 150-155 
5. Nonmoney incom~ 13.6 14.2 13.6 12-14 12-14 
6. Realized gross income (4+5) 160.0 164.4 163.2 163-167 163-168 
7. Value of inventory change 7.9 -2.6 -11.7 6-10 -2 - 2 
8. Total Gross Income (6+7) 167.9 161.8 151.4 171-175 163-168 
Production Expenses: e/ 
9. Cash expenses - f/ 111.4 113.4 109.5 115-117 118-122 
10. Total expenses 136.9 139.5 135.3 141-143 142-147 
Income Statement: 
11. Net cash income (4-9) ~/ !1 35.0 36.8 40.1 34-38 31-36 
12. Deflated net cash income/(1972$) ~/ 17.9 17.8 18.6 15-17 13-15 
13. Net farm income (8-10) ~ I 31.0 22.3 16.1 29-33 19-24 
14. Deflated net farm income (1972$) ~/ 15.9 10.8 7.5 13-15 8-10 
15. Deflated net farm income (1967$) - 11.4 7.7 5.4 9-11 6-8 
16. Off farm income 39.8 39.4 41.0 41-45 43-47 
Other Sources and Uses of Funds 
17. Change in loans outstanding !/ 15.5 6.8 2.9 0-4 0-4 
Real estate 9.3 3.7 2.1 -2-2 -2-2 
Nonreal estate !/ 6.2 3.1 0.8 0-4 0-4 
18. Rental income 5.7 5.6 4.3 4-6 4-6 
19. Gross cash flow (11+1fl18) 56.1 49.3 47.3 41-45 38-43 
20. Capital expendkrufls - 16.8 13.6 13.1 12-14 11-15 
21. Net cash flow- - (19-20) 39.3 35.6 34.2 29-33 26-31 
SOURCE: Agricultural Finance Outlook and Situation, ERS, USDA, January, 1985. 
F = Forecast. a/ Includes net CCC loans. b/ Income from custom work, machine hire, and farm 
recreational activities. c/ Numbers in parentheses indicate the combination of items required to 
calculate a given item. d/ Value of home consumption of farm products and imputed rental value of 
farm dwellings. e/ Excludes depreciation and perquisites to hired labor. f/ Excludes farm dwellings. 
g/ Deflated by the GNP implicit price deflator. h/ Deflated by the CPI-U. i/ Excludes CCC loans. 
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After adjusting for inflation, average net farm income through the 
first half of the 1980s has been more than a third lower than the av~rage 
for the 1970s and almost a fourth less than the 1960s. In 1983, real net 
farm income was the lowest in 50 years. USDA estimates that 1985 income 
will be only marginally higher than the 1983 low. 
Here, in brief, are some of the factors that are likely to impact on 
both net cash income and net farm income during 1985: 
1) Gross cash receipts from crops and livestock are likely to be up 
about two percent this year, thanks to larger crop marketings and somewhat 
higher livestock prices. 
2) Government payments will be lower because the PIK program has 
ended. 
3) Farm input costs will increase marginally, probably a bit less 
than the expected inflation rate of 4 - 5 percent. Interest rates on farm 
loans for the entire year will not change much on a net basis. 
4) The impact of items 2 and 3 will more than offset item 1. Thus, 
farmers and ranchers are likely to remain under financial pressure during 
the year ahead. 
Balance Sheet for the Farm Sector 
Farm Assets 
The value of all U.S. farm assets, including those of farm households, 
is estimated to have fallen 0.8 percent between January 1, 1984, and 
January 1, 1985. The January 1, 1985, estimated value of assets was 
$1,022.4 billion, $67.4 billion less than the peak nominal value on January 
1, 1981 (Table 2). 
Farm real estate values were expected to have dropped 2.0 percent 
during 1984 after drops of one percent in 1983 and six percent in 1982. 
Low farm income and reduced expectations of income growth in the future, 
together with high interest rates have resulted in substantially lower bids 
for farm real estate. 
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TABLE 2. Balance Sheet of the U.S. Farming Sector, 1981-1985 
Items/year (Jan. 1) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985!!::./ 
----------Billion Dollars----------
Assets 
Physical assets: 
.Real estate 
Nonreal estate: 
Livestock and poultry 
Machinery and motor vehicles 
Crops stored on and off-farm 
Household equipment and furnishings 
Financial assets: 
Deposits and currency 
Savings bonds 
Investments in co-ops 
Total assets 
Claims 
Liabilities 
Real estate debt 
Nonreal estate debt to 
CCC 
Other 
Total liabilities 
Proprietors' equity 
Total claims 
Debt to asset ratio 
(Total liabilities/total assets) 
828.4 
60.8 
102.5 
35.9 
19.4 
16.2 
3.8 
22.8 
1,089.8 
95.5 
5.0 
81.5 
182.0 
907.8 
1,089.8 
16.7 
818.9 
53.6 
108.8 
36.3 
20.8 
16.7 
3.6 
24.6 
1,083.3 
105.6 
8.0 
88.1 
201.7 
881.6 
1,083.3 
18.6 
772.5 
52.9 
111.0 
42.1 
22.6 
17.4 
3.5 
26.8 
1,048.8 
109.5 
15.4 
91.4 
216.3 
832.5 
1,048.8 
20.6 
764.5 
49.8 
108.2 
33.7 
24.8 
18.2 
3.6 
28.3 
1,031.1 
111.6 
10.8 
92.2 
214.7 
816.4 
1,031.1 
20.8 
SOURCE: Agricultural Finance Outlook and Situation, ERS, USDA, January, 1985. 
2:.! Preliminary. 
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749.2 
50.4 
106.5 
38.2 
26.0 
18.7 
3.7 
29.7 
1,022.4 
110.9 
8.3 
93.0 
212.1 
810.7 
1,022.4 
20.7 
Preliminary estimates for Nebraska, however, suggest that asset values 
declined at a much more rapid rate than the national average during 1984 
(Table 3). Total in-state farm assets of $32.3 billion on January 1, 1985, 
were down $3.5 billion or nearly 10 percent from a year earlier. Si~ce 
1981, Nebraska's farm sector has experienced a drop in asset values of 
$11.2 billion or 26 percent. On a real (inflation adjusted) basis, the 
loss in asset values is even greater, about 39 percent. 
As is true for the country as a whole, the reduction in Nebraska asset 
values is almost wholly accounted for by reduced farm real estate values. 
Preliminary estimates suggest that Nebraska farm real estate values dropped 
about 35 percent in the 1981-85 period. 
Though conclusive evidence is not available, the greater relative 
decline in Nebraska farm assets may be caused by several factors. 
1) The livestock and crop enterprises which dominate the state's 
agricultural economy have generated sub-par incomes in recent years. 
2) Nebraska farmers in the early 1980s had relatively higher debt 
loads than farmers in most other states. Thus, when interest rates rose, 
financial stress was experienced more quickly. Financial stress, in turn, 
directly impacts on farm asset values. 
3) Rapid irrigation development in Nebraska during the 1970s led to 
substantial capital (and debt) expansion; this especially appears to have 
been a factor contributing to financial stress in areas where development 
occurred on marginal lands. 
Farm Debt 
Total U.S. farm debt is reported to have declined by 1.2 percent to 
$212.1 billion on January 1, 1985 (Table 2). This is the second 
consecutive year of decline after an all-time peak of $216.3 billion was 
reached in 1983. The last time total farm debt declined two or more 
consecutive years was in 1944-45. Excluding CCC debt, the total was 
essentially unchanged in 1984. Total farm debt increased at a compound 
annual rate of 13.2 percent during 1971-80, but this slowed to 3.9 percent 
yearly for 1981-85. 
Total debt on Nebraska farms has also dropped since January 1, 1983 
(Table 3). The estimated total debt of $10.3 billion on January 1, 1985, 
is $900 million (8.7 percent) less than the total two years earlier. 
In general, reductions in outstanding debt are a reflection of 1) farm 
liquidations that have already occurred and 2) i ncreased cautiousness on 
the part of lending institutions. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City recently reported that farmers 
in the Tenth Federal Reserve District left agriculture at about three times 
the normal rate during a six-month period ending October 1, 1984. Some 
farmers left voluntarily; others were forced out by foreclosure 
preceedings. 
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TABLE 3. Abbreviated Balance Sheet of Nebraska's Farming Sector (Including Farm 
Households) January 1, 1981-85. 
Projected 
Item 
Assets 
Real Estate 
Nonreal Estate 
TOTAL 
Claims 
Real Estate 
Nonreal Estate 
TOTAL 
Equity 
Ratios 
Equity/Assets 
Debt/Equity 
Debt/Assets 
1981 
31.5 
12.0 
43.5 
3.6 
5.1 
8.7 
34.7 
79.9 
25.2 
20.1 
1982 1983 1984 1985 
-----------Billion Dollars-----------
29.8 26.8 23.6 20.5 
12.2 13.1 12.2 ll.8 
42.0 39.9 35.8 32.3 
4.0 4.2 4.3 4.3 
5.6 7.0 6.4 6.0 
9.6 11.2 10.7 10.3 
32.4 28.7 25.1 21.9 
----------Ratio Percentage ----------
77.2 72.0 70.1 67.8 
29.6 38.9 42.6 47.0 
22.8 28.0 30.0 31.7 
SOURCE: Primary data are from Economic Indicators of the Farming Sector, State Income & Balance 
Sheet Statistics Series, Economic Research:Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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In addition, lenders generally are placing much more emphasis on cash 
flow projections when making decisions on who will receive new loans or 
loan extensions. Commercial banks are more frequently requiring real 
estate as collateral for short and intermediate loans. Farm input 
businesses are much less likely to offer unsecured loans to those who are 
not good credit risks. In short, borrowers must meet certain rigid tests 
with regard to repayment capability. 
Farm Equity3/ 
Farm sector equity in the United States is expected to have decreased 
$5.7 billion between January 1, 1984, and January 1, 1985, as assets 
decreased more than debt (Table 2). This would represent the fourth 
consecutive year that farm sector equity value declined. During the 
1970s, gains in real wealth from increased equity in the farm business were 
a significant portion of the total returns for many farmers. But in the 
1980s, the decline in real wealth has resulted in negative total return to 
investment (includes net income) and reduced borrowing capacity. 
The debt/asset ratio increased slightly in 1984 and now stands at the 
highest level since the 1930s. 
In Nebraska, the equity position of farmers has deteriorated at a much 
more rapid rate than for all farms nationally. Between 1981 and 1985, 
equity is estimated to have dropped by 12.8 billion dollars or 36.9 percent 
(Table 3). This obviously represents a significant erosion of wealth from 
the farm sector, with resulting implications for future financing, 
consumption patterns and tenure arrangements. 
On January 1, 1984, Nebraska's farm sector had the highest average 
debt/asset ratio among all the states at 30.0 percent. In all likelihood, 
the debt/asset estimate of 31.7 percent for January 1, 1985, will be at or 
near the top as well. 
21 Equity is a mathematical determination of the difference between assets 
and liabilities (claims). Equity is sometimes synonymously referred to as 
"net worth" when describing the financial status of individual farmers. 
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Farm Financial Stress 
The degree of financial stress being experienced in the U.S. farm 
sector varies from producer to producer. Lenders and farm financial 
analysts generally agree that farm/ranch operations with debts equal to 40 
percent or more of the value of assets are likely to be feeling 
considerable stress. Moreover, many of those with debt-to-asset ratios of 
50 percent or more are likely to face partial or total liquidation or will 
require major restructuring of debts and assets to survive. 
Impact of Debt on Profitability 
It is important to consider the level of debts and the rate of 
interest when considering profitability. More specifically how do debts 
impact on a producer's return to equity? Table 4 presents a U.S. time 
series of rates of return to farm assets and equity through 1984. Clearly, 
returns during the 1980s have been less than those in the previous decade; 
not only is income roughly two-thirds of the 1970s level but real (adjusted 
for inflation) capital losses have occurred. Over the first half of the 
decade, total return to assets have averaged -3.4 percent annually. In 
other words, for a producer with no debts, his income return on equity 
would have been -3.4 percent. 
However, if a producer had debts, losses magnify quickly. Suppose, 
for example, that an individual producer had a debt/asset ratio of 50 
percent, returns on assets of -5.0 percent and paid an average interest 
rate of 12 percent. Under such conditions, the annual rate of return to 
equity capital would be -22 percent (Table 5). In other words, over a 
period of five years, such a producer would become financially insolvent. 
The higher the level of indebtedness and the higher the interest rate, the 
more quickly net worth disappears when the return on assets is low or 
negative. 
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TABLE 4. Rate of Returns to Farm Assets and Equity, U.S., 1960-8~/ 
Year Income 
Returns to Assets 
Real 
Capital 
Gains 
TOTAL Returns to 
Equity 
------------------------Percent---------------------------
1960 2.3 -1.1 1.3 0.9 
61 2.4 2.8 5.2 5.3 
62 2.1 1.5 3.7 3.6 
63 2.3 1.7 4.0 4.0 
64 1.5 2.6 4.1 4.1 
1965 2.4 3.9 6.3 6.9 
66 2.5 2.0 4.5 4.8 
67 2.0 0.7 2.7 2.7 
68 1.5 0.0 1.5 1.5 
69 2.0 -1.0 1.1 1.0 
1970 1.8 -0.6 1.2 1.0 
71 2.0 3.4 5.4 6.0 
72 3.6 8.1 11.7 13.6 
73 7.1 11.3 18.4 22.2 
74 4.5 -0.1 4.4 5.6 
1975 3.4 7.7 11.2 13.0 
76 1.8 10.0 l1.8 13.6 
77 1.6 4.2 5.8 6.5 
78 2.6 8.7 11.3 13.5 
79 2.7 4.2 6.9 8.3 
1980 1.3 -1.0 0.3 0.3 
81 2.5 -8.6 -6.2 -8.4 
82 1.6 -8.0 -6.4 -9.7 
83 1.0 -2.7 -1.6 -4.0 
84 2.8 -5.9 -3.1 -6.0 
1960-69 Ave. 2.1 1.3 3.4 3.5 
1970-79 Ave. 3.1 5.7 8.8 10.3 
1980-84 Ave. 1.8 -5.2 -3.4 -5.6 
SOURCE: Melichar, Emanuel, Agricultural Finance DataBook, Board of Governors, Federal 
Reserve System, December 1984. 
a/ Series Excludes Farm Households 
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TABLE 5. Return t o Equity Capital a t Various Profitability Levels and Financial Conditions 
Debt to Asset RJtio 
Rate of Return~ 
30% D/A Ratio 
- 6%--
4% 
2% 
. -5% 
-10% 
40% D/A Ratio 
- 6%--
4% 
2% 
-5% 
-10% 
50% D/A Ratio 
- 6%--
4% 
2% 
-5% 
-10% 
60% D/A Ratio 
- 6%--
4% 
2% 
-5% 
-10% 
70% D/A Ratio 
----6% 
4% 
2% 
-5% 
-10% 
Percent return to 
b/ Percent return to 
More specifically, 
Interes t Rate on Outstanding Debt 
10 11 12 13 14 15 
-------------Percent Return to Equity Capita~~--------
4.3 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.1 
1.4 1.0 0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.7 
-1.4 -1.9 -2.3 -2 .7 -3.1 -3. 6 
-11.4 -11.9 -12.3 -12.7 -13.1 -13. 6 
-18.6 -19. 0 -19.4 -19. 9 -20.3 -20.7 
3.3 2.7 2.0 1.3 0.7 0 .0 
0.0 -0.6 -1.3 -2.0 -2.7 -3.3 
-3.3 -4.0 -4.7 -5.3 -6 .0 -6.7 
-15. 0 -15.7 -16.3 -17.0 -17.7 -18.3 
-23.3 -24.0 -24.7 -25.3 -26.0 -26 .0 
2.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 -2.0 -3.0 
-2.0 -3.0 -4.0 -5.0 -6.0 -7.0 
-6.0 -7.0 -8.0 -9.0 -10.0 -11. 0 
-20.0 -21.0 -22.0 -23.0 -24.0 -25.0 
-30 .0 -31.0 -32.0 -33.0 -34.0 -35. 0 
0.0 -1.5 -3.0 -4.5 -6. 0 -7. 5 
-5.0 -6.5 -8.0 - 9 .5 -11. 0 -12.5 
-10.0 -11.5 -13.0 -14.5 -16. 0 -17.5 
-27.5 -29.0 -30.5 -32. 0 -33.5 - 35 . 0 
-40.0 -41.5 -43.0 -44.5 -46. 0 - 47.5 
-3.3 -5.7 -8.0 -1 0.3 -1 2 . 7 - 15.0 
-1 0.0 -12.3 -14.7 - 17.0 -19.3 - 21.7 
-16.7 -1 9.0 -21.3 - 23.7 -26. 0 - 28.3 
-40.0 -42.3 -44.7 - 47 . 0 - 49.3 - 51.7 
-56.7 -59.0 - 61.3 -63.7 -66.0 - 68 .3 
total capital before interest payments on any borrowed capital. 
equity is: (Total Return - Cost of Credit) Equity. ';' 
it is: (% Return to Total Capital (% Interest Rate X % Debt) . (1 - % - -~ 
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Debt) 
Compared to those with little or no debt, the financial status of 
heavily indebted producers is generally worse than at any time since the 
1930s. There are, however, exceptions to the general proposition of .heavy 
debts being tied to high financial stress. In order to understand the 
incidence of financial stress problems in detail, we need at least three 
more pieces of critical information. 
The first relates to debt loads by size of farm. Table 6 shows 
estimated distributions of farm operators and their assets and debt by size 
of farm as measured by annual sales. For example, operators with annual 
sales of $500,000 or more constitute one percent of operators, own 10 
percent of total operators' assets, and owe 18 percent of total operators' 
debt. Note that a general pattern of reduced debt/asset ratios occurs as 
individual farm size is reduced. 
Second, despite relatively high debt/asset ratios, the largest farms 
have often remained profitable. A major reason is that they generate a 
relatively high dollar volume of sales per dollar of assets. For example, 
Melichar estimates that the largest farms represent only 10 percent of 
TABLE 6. Estimated Percentage Distribution of U.S. Farm Operators and 
Their Debt and Assets, By Size of Farm, January 1, 1984.* 
Size of farm 
Annual value of 
farm products 
sold (thousands 
of dollars) 
All farms •••••••••• 
500 and over ••••••• 
200 to 499 ••••••••• 
100 to 199 ••••••••• 
40 to 99 . ......... . 
20 to 39 ••••••••••• 
10 to 19 ••••••••••• 
5 to 9 . ........... . 
2.5 to 4.9 ••••••••• 
Under 2.5 •••••••••• 
Operators 
100 
1 
3 
7 
16 
11 
12 
13 
14 
23 
Assets 
100 
10 
13 
16 
22 
10 
8 
6 
6 
8 
SOURCE: Melichar, Emanuel, "The Incidence of Financial Stress in 
Agriculture," paper presented at Agricultural Seminar, 
Congressional Budget Office, November 13, 1984. 
Debt 
100 
18 
18 
21 
22 
7 
5 
3 
2 
4 
* Estimates shown are based on data from the 1979 Farm Finance Survey, 
Bureau of the Census, as tabulated by Economic Research Service, USDA, and 
adjusted and updated by the author. 
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operators' assets but generate 29 percent of gross sales (Table 7). This 
relationship, in turn, helped these operators garner 48 percent of net farm 
income. In contrast, middle-sized farms ($40,000-99,999 in gross income) 
had 22 percent of the assets and only 15 percent of the net farm income. 
Information presented in Table 7 appears to support the hypothesis 
that some economies of scale exist for the largest farming operations. 
Sometimes, the largest farms simply are better able to use their available 
assets (and debt) to generate income. In such cases, the ratio of debt to 
net income is lower than for smaller farms. Fragmentary information also 
suggests that these large farming operations tend to specialize in 
commodities such as poultry, fruits and vegetables, none of which are 
significant in Nebraska. 
Third, off-farm income may be used by farmers to offset farm debt-
servicing costs. In Table 8, the distribution of farm operators' debt by 
value-of-sales classes is compared with off-farm income. The last column 
in the table shows off-farm income as a percentage of debt. The point is 
that on smaller farms, off-farm income is generally sufficient to cover 
debt-servicing costs. For example, on farms with sales under $10,000 
(which represent one-half of all farms), operators' annual off-farm income 
exceeds their total farm debt, most of which is really home mortgage and 
consumer debt. 
At the other extreme, on the largest farms, annual off-farm income is 
equal to only two percent of outstanding debt. Clearly, for this farm size 
class, off-farm income is relatively insignificant; it won't pay even a 
fifth of the interest due, to say nothing of the debt principal on such 
farms . 
Incidence of Stress 
The preceding analysis suggests that stress may not be as dominant 
among the largest farms, which tend to be highly profitable, or smaller 
farms, which tend to rely heavily on off-farm income. There are, of 
course, exceptions. For example, there is little question that heavily 
indebted operators of very large cash grain farms are now experiencing 
financial stress, while similarly leveraged operators producing specialty 
crops may have high profitability. Also, some smaller farm operations may 
not receive much off-farm income. 
But setting aside special consideration of the largest and smallest 
farms, there are 625,000 "mid-size" farms with annual sales of $40,000 to 
$499 ,999 . Where debt levels are large for individual farms in this group, 
financial stress is likely to be significant. These farms often have 
neither dominant off-farm income nor exceptional profitability. 
Information presented earlier (Table 5) suggests that operators with 
deb t/asset ratios above 40 percent will usually be finally stressed. 
Operators with this level of debt on farms with sales from $40,000 to 
$499,999 constitute about nine percent of all operators, own about T4 
percent of total operators' assets, and owe about 39 percent of total 
operators' debt. This amounts to about 210,000 operators who own assets 
valued at $107 billion and who owe about $73 billion, one-third of total 
farm debt. 
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TABLE 7. Estimated Percentage Distribution of U.S. Farm Opera tors and Their Assets, Debt, a nd Gros E 
and Net Farm Income, By Size of Farm, January 1, 1984. 
Size of farm 
Annual value of 
farm products 
sold (thousands 
of dollars) 
All farms •••••••••• 
500 and over ••••••• 
200 to 499 ••••••••• 
100 to 199 •.•••••.• 
40 to 99 ••••••••••• 
20 to 39 ••••••••••• 
10 to 19 ••••••••••• 
5 to 9 ••••••••••••• 
2. 5 to 4. 9 ••••••••• 
Under 2.5 •••••••••• 
SOURCE: Melichar, ibid. 
Operators 
100 
1 
3 
7 
16 
11 
12 
13 
14 
23 
Assets 
100 
10 
13 
16 
22 
10 
8 
6 
6 
8 
Debt 
100 
18 
18 
21 
22 
7 
5 
3 
2 
4 
Gross 
cash 
farm 
income 
100 
29 
19 
19 
20 
6 
3 
2 
1 
1 
He t 
f a rm 
income 
100 
48 
19 
17 
15 
3 
0 
0 
-1 
-1 
Operators, assets, and debt are as of January 1, 1984, e stimated as described in the note t o Table 
6. 
Farm income data are USDA estimate s for 1983, from ERS ECIFS 3-3, pp. 85-88. 
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TABLE 8. Estimated Percentage Distribution of U.S. Farm Operators and Their Assets, Debt, and 
Off-farm Income, By Size of Farm, January 1, 1984. 
Size of farm 
Annual value of 
farm products 
sold (thousands 
of dollars) 
All farms ••••••• • •• 
500 and over • •••••• 
200 to 499 ••••••••• 
100 to 199 ••••••••• 
40 to 99 ••••••••••• 
20 to 39 ••••••••••• 
10 to 19 ••••••.•••• 
5 to 9 ••••••••••••• 
2. 5 to 4. 9 ••••••••. 
Under 7..5 •••••••••• 
SOURCE: Melichar, ibid. 
Operators 
100 
1 
3 
7 
16 
11 
12 
13 
14 
23 
Assets 
100 
10 
13 
16 
22 
10 
8 
6 
6 
8 
Debt 
100 
18 
18 
21 
22 
7 
5 
3 
2 
4 
Off-farm 
income 
100 
2 
3 
5 
10 
9 
12 
16 
16 
27 
Off-farm 
income as 
percentage 
of debt 
22 
2 
4 
5 
10 
28 
57 
104 
143 
159 
Operators, assets, and debt are as of January 1, 1984, estimated as described in the note to Table 
6. 
Off-farm income data are USDA estimates for 1983, from ERS ECIFS 3-3, p. 89. 
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Two special concerns come from this analysis. First, to the extent 
this problem is geographically concentrated (e.g., the Midwest), loca~ized 
stress is much more severe for creditors, agribusinesses and main street 
businesses than the data as a whole indicate. Second, to the extent that 
farms under stress are perceived to be full-time "family" farmers, current 
stress may bring changes to the overall structure of agriculture that 
society deems undesirable. 
Impact of Financial Stress on Lenders, Agribusinesses, 
and Rural Communities 
As financial difficulties for farmers have continued, lenders, 
agribusinesses and rural communities have been affected as well. Most 
analysts expect the "ripple effect" of poor farm conditions to continue to 
be felt hy others in 1985. 
Agricultural banks as a group have historically appeared to be in 
sound condition with adequate profits, capital reserves, and liquidity. 
However, certain trends are disconcerting. Several banks failed in 
Nebraska in 1984, most of which had predominately agricultural loan 
portfolios. The proportion of "problem loans" has increased for most banks 
in rural areas. Loan-loss reserves are being increased wherever possible 
and lending policies are becoming more stringent. However, despite 
increased cautiousness on the part of agricultural banks, further 
consolidation in banks would not be surprising during the year ahead. 
The Farm Credit System (Production Credit Associations, Federal Land 
Banks and Bank for Cooperatives) is feeling similar pressure: loan losses 
and late payments have increased, profits have declined, and competition is 
strong for quality borrowers. 
Production Credit Association (PCA) losses currently exceed those of 
the Federal Land Banks (FLB). This does not necessarily imply that PCAs 
are in worse condition, but only that PCA problem loans surfaced earlier 
than those of FLBs. Some short-term lenders have allowed borrowers to 
service long-term debt from their operating lines of credit. As short-term 
lenders terminate this practice, additional FLB problem loans are more 
likely to appear. 
The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) typically carries the largest 
share of high-risk loans because, as a lender of last resort, it lends to 
farmers who cannot obtain credit elsewhere. Other lenders can often 
transfer marginal accounts to FmHA to improve their position and avoid 
added risk. In late 1984, FmHA had over $25.4 billion in outstanding farm 
debt. Of the total amount, 21.3 percent is owed by borrowers who are 
behind schedule in their payments, and who account for 29.6 percent of the 
total farm program borrowers. FmHA's delinquent farm debt has grown 
rapidly over the past four years, from $827.6 million to about $5.4 
billion. 
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With the current level of economic stress in the farm sector, it is 
not likely that FmHA's role will diminish nor that its portfolio will 
improve in 1985. Indeed, it would not be surprising to see increased · 
reliance on FmHA. As such, questions will continue to be raised about just 
how far the "lender of last resort" should go in providing financial 
support to individual farming operations. 
Agribusinesses have two major concerns about current financial 
conditions in agriculture. The first relates to overdue and unsecured farm 
accounts. The concern is not only about receiving payment on such 
accounts, but in the event of bankruptcy, unsecured creditors would have a 
low priority in receiving returns from the bankruptcy. Uncollectable 
accounts receivable are a frequent contributor to business failures. This 
problem is magnified for many agribusinesses by narrow operating margins 
which provide little opportunity for "catch-up" elsewhere in the business. 
Second, to the extent current financial conditions in agriculture 
cause consolidation into larger farm units, the possiblity of bypassing 
smaller agribusinesses in rural communities increases. Simply stated, 
larger farm operators tend to patronize larger agribusinesses, where price 
discounts and other special services are more likely. 
As agribusinesses struggle for survival, other businesses in small 
agriculturally oriented towns are likely to be negatively affected as well. 
This, in turn, will likely hurt a community's tax base and make it 
difficult to maintain such institutions as schools and churches. In short, 
poor farm financial conditions cannot be isolated; in much of Nebraska, the 
impact on towns and villages is both direct and substantial. 
Alternatives for Dealing with Farm Financial Stress 
There are no easy or painless solutions to current financial 
difficulties in the farm sector. The most helpful development, of course, 
would be for cash income to increase across all sectors of production 
agriculture. However, the outlook for 1985 appears to be much like what's 
already been experienced in earlier years of this decade. If anything, 
conditions are worsening because of the cumulative effect of several 
consecutive years of financial stress. 
Many proposals are being advanced to address farm financial stress. 
Each proposal, either explicitly or implicitly, must answer several 
questions: 
1) How much assistance should be provided by the public sector to 
farm operators? 
2) How should eligibility for assistance be determined? 
3) What mechanism should be used for providing assistance to farm 
operators? 
4) What type of assistance should be provided? 
The following concerns have been voiced by those who have tried to 
answer these questions: 
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1) With respect to the first question, some have argued that farm 
problems are primarily the result of unwise fiscal and monetary policies of 
the federal government and, therefore, the federal government has an 
obligation to provide substantial assistance. Supporters also indicate 
that failure to address farm financial problems will have negative economic 
and social implications for large sections of the country. 
However, others point out that the federal government budget precludes 
providing much, if any, assistance. Still others argue that massive 
assistance to heavily-indebted farmers would be "unfair" to those who have 
been conservative in their use of debt financing. 
Except for the "fiscal and monetary policies" argument, debate on 
potential assistance from state (Nebraska) government centers on the same 
issues. 
2) Questions about eligibility for assistance presume that assistance 
would not be open-ended. In particular, it is frequently proposed that 
assistance be provided to tl1ose with debt-to-asset ratios above a pre-
determined level or who could not survive without assistance. Gross or net 
income may also limit aid eligibility. Some analysts further suggest that 
eligibility standards should not be too exacting in the interest of 
approving assistance applications as quickly as possible. 
Political compromise would ultimately be necessary to determine 
eligibility. 
3) The nature of the mechanism for providing assistance has received 
much attention. At the state level, proposals have included establishing a 
state owned and operated bank and increased authority for the Nebraska 
Investment Finance Authority to provide lower-interest loans to farmers. 
Another proposal is to provide a state agricultural credit fund for 
purchase of farm loans from failed banks and other credit institutions. 
Some individuals have called for a moratorium on all farm loan 
foreclosures. 
Federal initiatives might involve new authority for the Farmers Home 
Administration such as providing additional subsidies on interest rates, 
principal deferral or write-downs, relaxed regulations on loan 
foreclosures, and participation in asset ownership through a lease-back 
arrangement. 
In addition, Neil Harl, Professor of Agricultural Economics at Iowa 
State University, has proposed a new federally chartered corporation be 
implemented to "warehouse" questionable farm debts until farm financial 
conditions improve. The new corporation might work directly with original 
lenders to reduce interest rates and provide a federal subsidy for the 
purpose of lowering interest rates. In return, participating farmers might 
be required to share asset ownership with lenders. 
18 
4) Assistance provided might be in two general forms. The first 
would involve increasing cash receipts through any of several commodity 
program initiatives of the federal government. This alternative seems . 
unlikely, since current financial stress in agriculture is closely 
associated with debt-servicing costs. 
Second, if assistance is provided to deal with debt problems, it could 
focus primarily on debt principal or interest costs. In the short-run, 
reduction of interest costs might provide the most assistance. Longer-
range, however, debt principal reductions may be the only way to assure 
viability in agriculture for those with the heaviest debt loads. 
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